In the Matter of James T. Ranney

SUMMARY²

The respondent, James T. Ranney, Esq., was suspended for one year and one day for misconduct in connection with his representation of clients in a Land Court matter, as described below.

In March 2012, the respondent was retained to represent a husband and wife (the debtors) to defend against foreclosure on their home by the Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (BONYM). On June 4, 2012, BONYM held a foreclosure auction at the property; BONYM was the highest bidder and took title. Prior to that date, there were a number of communications among the respondent, the clients and BONYM’s attorneys about the date of the auction, as follows:

By letter dated April 13, 2012, faxed and copied to the debtors, the respondent requested that BONYM’s attorneys confirm that the date of the auction was being postponed.

By email to the respondent dated April 16, 2012, BONYM’s attorneys confirmed that the auction date had been postponed to June 4, 2012.

On May 3, 2012, the husband sent the respondent an email in which he wrote “the new sale date was set for the 6th…. [sic]”

By letter dated June 1, 2012 faxed and sent by UPS express mail to BONYM’s attorneys and copied to the debtors, the respondent wrote among other things that “[t]his matter is scheduled for a foreclosure sale on Monday June 4, 2012 at 12 P.M.”

In June 2012, the respondent filed on behalf of the debtors a Petition to Try Title challenging the validity of BONYM’s foreclosure sale pursuant to G.L. c.240, §§ 1-5. In August 2012 and in October 2012, the respondent amended the petition.

In October 2012, BONYM filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Petition. During a status conference in July 2013, the court notified the parties that it intended to use its discretion pursuant to Mass R. Civ. P. 12, to convert the matter from a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

In August 2013, the respondent filed an Opposition to [Lenders’] Motion to Dismiss Being Treated by the Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment. In his opposition, the respondent knowingly, falsely represented that the “Petitioner and her husband never received notice that the sale purportedly noticed for April 18, 2012 had been postponed.” The respondent supported this false statement with an affidavit that he prepared for the husband that falsely stated that “we never received any other notice that the foreclosure sale scheduled for April 18, 2012 was postponed.”

On October 1, 2013, the Land Court denied summary judgment and found that the only material issues remaining for trial included whether public proclamation of the postponement was made on April 18, 2012, and whether the debtors received notice of the postponement date by any other means.

In November 2013, BONYM’s attorneys served its first request for production of documents on the respondent seeking “[a]ll correspondence concerning or referencing a scheduled foreclosure sale of the Property.” The request for production also included an express instruction to create a privilege log if the debtor claimed privilege over any responsive document.

The respondent served responses and agreed to produce responsive nonprivileged documents. The respondent did not serve any objection to the requests for production.

The respondent withheld from production key responsive documents such as the respondent’s April 13, 2012 letter to opposing counsel requesting a continuance for the foreclosure date, the April 16, 2012 email from opposing counsel’s paralegal advising the respondent of the June 4, 2012 postponement date, the May 3, 2012 email from the husband to the respondent in which he acknowledged that he knew that the initial sale date had been postponed, and the respondent’s June 1, 2012 letter to opposing counsel in which the respondent acknowledged that he knew that the initial sale date had been postponed. The respondent failed to disclose the existence of these documents and to state with specificity the basis for withholding them.

In January 2014, the parties filed a joint pre-trial memorandum in which BONYM listed the respondent as a trial witness on the issue of actual notice to the debtors of the postponement of the foreclosure sale. The respondent filed a motion for a protective order seeking to strike the respondent as a trial witness. The respondent claimed that any communications between himself and the client were attorney-client privileged and/or already in the lenders’ possession. BONYM filed an opposition. In February 2014, the Court allowed the respondent to be a trial witness and held that he was disqualified from representing the debtor because he was going to testify as a fact witness.

On July 9, 2014, the trial commenced at Land Court and the debtor appeared pro se. On August 19, 2014, the second day of trial, the respondent appeared as a witness pursuant to subpoena and testified at trial. The respondent truthfully testified that he and his clients had notice of the postponement of the auction. He also for the first time produced documents concerning notice of the postponed foreclosure sale pursuant to subpoena. Among other things, the respondent provided: 1) his April 13, 2012 letter to opposing counsel requesting a postponement of the foreclosure sale date copied to the clients; 2) the April 16, 2012 email to the respondent by which opposing counsel’s paralegal confirmed the postponement date to June 4, 2012; 3) the May 3, 2012 email from the debtor to the respondent regarding the new foreclosure sale date and the email chain showing that the respondent received confirmation of the correct date by way of the April 16 email; and 4) the respondent’s June 1, 2012 letter to opposing counsel, copied to the debtors, confirming the foreclosure date for June 4, 2012 at 12 P.M.

After trial, the Court found that the respondent and the debtors had knowledge of the postponement of the foreclosure sale. The Court also found that the respondent’s knowledge of the postponement of the foreclosure may properly be imputed to the debtors and consequently they were deemed to have constructive knowledge of the postponement of the foreclosure sale.

The respondent’s multiple false representations to the court that his clients never received notice of the foreclosure postponement and his conduct in causing the husband to sign an affidavit containing an assertion that the respondent knew was not true violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(a) (1) and (4), 3.4(b) and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

The respondent’s failure to provide in discovery, among other things, the April 13, 2012 letter, the April 16, 2012 email, the May 3, 2012 email, and the June 1, 2012 letter violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(a) and (b) and 8.4(c), (d) and (h).

In mitigation, the respondent did not act with a selfish motive.

This matter came before the Board of Bar on a stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations and a joint recommendation for a suspension of one year and one day. On April 6, 2017, the board unanimously voted to accept the stipulation and the joint recommendation. On May 10, 2017, the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County (Lenk, J.) entered an order suspending the respondent for one year and one day, effective thirty days after entry.

¹ The complete order of the Court is available by contacting the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County.

² Compiled by the Board of Bar Overseers based on the record filed with the Supreme Judicial Court.