In the Matter of Chantelle Hashem

IN RE: MATTER OF CHANTELLE HASHEM

BBO NO. 682806

The following opinion was posted at the time it was issued. It may be subject to appeal and may not be the final decision in the case. Readers are advised to check the BBO and SJC websites for more information.

 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS

OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

______________________________

In the Matter of

Chantelle Hashem,

Petition for Reinstatement

______________________________

SJC No. BD-2016-059

HEARING PANEL REPORT

I. Introduction

On September 22, 2023, the petitioner, Chantelle Hashem, filed her petition for reinstatement with the Supreme Judicial Court. We held a hearing on July 9, 2024. Represented by counsel, the petitioner testified on her own behalf and called four additional witnesses: Shawn Thorburn, who is a business owner and business partner with the petitioner; attorneys Jennifer V. Allen and Morjieta Derisier, and her therapist, Gale Brunault, LMHC. Bar counsel called no witnesses. Nine agreed exhibits were admitted into evidence.¹ At the end of the hearing, bar counsel did not oppose reinstatement. After considering the evidence and testimony, we recommend that the petitioner be reinstated.

II. Standard

A petitioner for reinstatement to the bar bears the burden of proving that she has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(5), namely that she possesses “the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth, and that his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to the public interest.” Matter of Weiss, 474 Mass. 1001, 1002, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 263, 264-265 (2016). The S.J.C.’s rule establishes two distinct requirements, focusing on (1) the personal characteristics of the petitioner and (2) the effect of reinstatement on the bar and the public. Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass.48, 52, 3 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 69, 73 (1982).

In making these determinations, a panel considering a reinstatement petition “looks to ‘(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was [suspended], (2) the petitioner’s character, maturity, and experience at the time of [her] [suspension], (3) the petitioner’s occupations and conduct in the time since [her] [suspension], (4) the time elapsed since the [suspension], and (5) the petitioner’s present competence in legal skills.’” Matter of Daniels, 442 Mass. 1037, 1038, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 120, 122-123 (2004), quoting Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92 (1996), and Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 460, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 133 (1975).

III. Disciplinary History

The petitioner was suspended for nine months2 after a default, entered January 11, 2017, for misconduct involving her representation of a client who was involved in a motor vehicle accident. She now seeks reinstatement. The pertinent facts that resulted in her suspension are as follows:³

The petitioner was admitted to the bar of Massachusetts on November 15, 2011. (Ex. 1 at BBO-002 and BBO-008; Tr. 7, petitioner). However, she took a year off and began practicing law as a solo practitioner about a year later. (Tr. 7, 9, petitioner). On April 16, 2013, she was retained to represent a client in a personal injury claim arising from a rental car accident in which he was involved. The other driver was found by her own insurance company to be 100% at fault for the accident. (Tr. 11-12, petitioner).⁴ By letter dated April 16, 2013, the petitioner notified both her client's and the adverse driver's insurance companies of her representation and requested written disclosure of the adverse driver's policy limits. After the petitioner sent these letters to the insurance companies, she failed to do any other work of substance on the personal injury component of the client's case. The petitioner felt it was unclear whether the client had actually been injured in the accident, and lost contact with him. (Tr. 11-12, petitioner).⁵ However, she failed to inform the client that she was not going to pursue his claim. (Tr. 12, 32, petitioner).

Between August 2013 and September 2014, the adverse driver's insurance company sent the petitioner letters requesting her client's medical and wage records to evaluate the claim. She failed to reply to any of the letters and did not forward any of the requested information.

From August 27, 2013, through September 2014, the client called the petitioner on numerous occasions to obtain information about his case. The petitioner failed to respond to his inquiries. By a letter sent by certified mail dated September 10, 2014, the client requested an update of his personal injury case. The client also advised the petitioner that he was being held in the Plymouth County Correctional Facility and provided his address. The petitioner received her client's letter in due course but failed at any time to respond.

On October 14, 2014, bar counsel received a complaint from the client, alleging that the petitioner had been unresponsive to his requests for information about his case. An assistant bar counsel then contacted the petitioner to inquire about her communication with the client. The petitioner informed the assistant bar counsel that she had recently written her client a letter that contained a status update of his case. The petitioner knew that she had not sent such a letter and that this statement was false, deceptive, and misleading. As she testified before us, “I brought the file in and I began lying about everything. Because I was scared and I didn’t know what was going to happen.” She admitted that she lied to bar counsel’s investigator and said she was going to “finish it,” even though she knew this was impossible because of the impending statute of limitations deadline. (Tr. 13, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-008, was in denial due to her shame and fear).

At bar counsel’s suggestion, the petitioner visited the client in prison⁶ and after that, she “shut down completely” and “stopped responding to any notices from the court, from everyone who wanted [her] to appear and explain [herself].” (Tr. 13, petitioner).

By email dated February 5, 2016, the petitioner represented to bar counsel that the client's personal injury claim was “in the stage of request for settlement from the insurer. The insurer has approximately 20 days left to make an offer of settlement.” In fact, the petitioner had not been in contact with the insurer and she knew that this statement was false, misleading and deceptive. (Ex. 1 at BBO-008).

On April 3, 2016, the statute of limitations expired on the client's personal injury claims. The petitioner failed to file an action with the court or negotiate a settlement with the insurance company.

The petitioner's failure to provide the services for which she was retained violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 1.2 (a), and 1.3. The petitioner's failure to maintain reasonable communication with her client and her failure to sufficiently explain the status of her work regarding the representation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a) and (b). The petitioner's conduct in making intentionally false statements to bar counsel in the course of bar counsel's investigation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c), (d) and (h). The petitioner's conduct in knowingly submitting fabricated letters to bar counsel during the course of bar counsel's investigation violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (b), 8.1(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d) and 8.4(h).

By April 2016, the petitioner stopped cooperating in bar counsel's investigation. By failing without good cause to comply with bar counsel's requests for information, the petitioner violated S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d), 8.4(g), and 8.4(h). On May 12, 2016, the petitioner was administratively suspended for non-cooperation by order of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3(2). Thereafter, the petitioner intentionally failed without good cause to comply with the order of administrative suspension, in violation of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17, and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c), 8.4(d) and (h).

On July 22, 2016, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline against the petitioner alleging the misconduct described above. The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition for discipline and was defaulted. On November 14, 2016, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to suspend the petitioner from the practice of law for nine months. On December 23, 2016, the petitioner was served with notice directing her to appear before a Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court on January 11, 2017. On January 11, 2017, the petitioner failed to appear and the single justice (Botsford, J.) issued an order suspending the petitioner for nine months with reinstatement to the practice of law contingent upon petition pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(4). Matter of Chantelle Hashem, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 192 (2017); Ex. 2 at BBO-035 and BBO-037.

When asked what she did wrong, the petitioner explained as follows: first, she should have promptly rejected the client’s case, given him his file, and told him of the statute of limitations so he could retain another attorney if he wanted. Second, when first contacted by bar counsel, she “should have been forthcoming with them that I had stopped working on the case and that I did not properly inform the client. And I don't know where to go from here.” (Tr. 15-16, petitioner).

We credit the petitioner’s testimony that, during the same time period, she had recently learned that her younger brother had a heroin addiction and that she was trying to get him help; she was repeatedly putting him in rehab (Tr. 14, petitioner), which she was doing while hiding it from her family. (Tr. 25, petitioner).⁷ At the same time, her parents were getting divorced. She felt that her “whole life was going up in smoke” and her professional judgment was “very, very clouded.” (Tr. 14, petitioner).

IV. Findings and Conclusions

A. Moral Qualifications

The conduct giving rise to the petitioner’s suspension is affirmative proof that she lacks the moral qualifications to practice law. See Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 460, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 134. That the misconduct “continues to be evidence against . . . [the petitioner] with respect to lack of moral character at later times [is] in accordance with the principle that ‘a state of things once proved to exist may generally be found to continue.’” Matter of Hiss, id. (citation omitted). To gain reinstatement, a petitioner has the burden of proving that she has led “‘a sufficiently exemplary life to inspire public confidence once again, in spite of h[er] previous actions.’” Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 92, quoting Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 452, 1 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. at 126. She can do this by proving she has reformed, since a “fundamental precept of our system is that persons can be rehabilitated.” Matter of Ellis, 457 Mass. 413, 414, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162, 163 (2010).

1. The Petitioner’s Questionnaire Responses and Hearing Testimony

Both the petitioner’s Questionnaire and her testimony were forthright in admitting her misconduct (including her failing to respond to the many requests from her client for the status of his case; followed by lying to her client and bar counsel, and then ceasing to cooperate and ignoring the disciplinary proceedings) and accepting sole responsibility for her serial neglect. (Ex. 1 at BBO-008 and BBO-009; Tr. 16, petitioner). She made no excuses, saying she knew better, was “100% at fault,” and there was no one else to blame but herself. (Tr. 16, 33, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-008 and BBO-009).

2. Work and Volunteer Activities

Evidence of moral reform can be found in good works that demonstrate a sense of responsibility to others. See Matter of Wong, 442 Mass. 1016, 1017-1018, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540, 544 (2004) (Court notes approvingly physical labor, active role in church community, participation in his sons’ activities and community work).

“A petitioner’s moral character can be illustrated by charitable activities, volunteer activities, commitment to family, or community work.” Matter of Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 583 (2009). Cf. Matter of Pezza, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 446 (2016) (finding sufficient moral qualifications for reinstatement after a suspension of one year and a day, despite only a passing statement in the Reinstatement Questionnaire of having done unspecified fundraising for a charity for an unstated period of time).

The petitioner grew up in the food service industry, and has continued to work in it since her suspension. (Tr.16-17, petitioner). She is the manager of one company and the general manager of another, and is generally responsible for the day-to-day operations. In addition, she is an ANSI-accredited serve safe food production manager and is certified in allergen awareness. (Ex. 1 at BBO-002/003 and 009; Tr. 42, petitioner). In addition to her own companies, she has a business partner, Shawn Thornburn; she not only handles the financial matters and paperwork for their company but also is responsible for repairs, payroll, stock, inventory, insurance policies, taxes, food safety inspections, etc. for his other companies. (Tr. 49, 83-84, 91-92, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-009/010; Tr. 176, 178-179, Thornburn).

In addition to all of this, the petitioner does volunteer counseling for high school students, assisting them in applying for financial aid, choosing financial aid plans, and helping them to complete the FAFSA applications, as well as college applications themselves. (Ex.1 at BBO-003 and-009; Tr. 88-89, petitioner).⁸ She has donated clothing and blankets to local drives for the last fifteen years. (Ex.1 at BBO-009). She also uses her businesses to donate food to local pantries. (Id.). She also drives ill, sick or blind patients (local neighbors) to doctors’ appointments. (Ex. 4 at BBO-004). When an elderly aunt who required assistance refused to move into assisted living, the petitioner became certified as a personal care assistant and cared for her for free, which included taking her to doctors’ appointments, and taking care of her bodily needs, until she died in January 2021. (Tr. 89-90, petitioner; Ex. at BBO-003). We observed and credit that the petitioner was very moved by her experiences. (Id.).

Particularly under the petitioner’s circumstances, including her family obligations, we find the petitioner’s volunteer activities and commitment to family in this regard to be sufficient proof of her moral character.

3. Witness Testimony

Four witnesses testified on the petitioner’s behalf: Shawn Thorburn, attorneys Jennifer V. Allen and Morjieta Derisier, and her therapist, Gale Brunault, LMHC.

Jennifer Allen is an attorney who went to law school with the petitioner and has known her since 2009; they are in regular contact. (Tr. 97, 109, Allen). In law school, they were in the same section; they took classes together and studied together. (Tr. 91-92, Allen). Allen rented an office in a building owned by the petitioner’s family, and was aware of the petitioner’s situation as it was happening. (Tr. 97-98, 103-104, Allen). The petitioner had made a full disclosure to Allen as to what she had done wrong; since then, the petitioner has repeatedly told Allen that she knows what she did was wrong, and has accepted responsibility for her misconduct. (Tr. 98-99, 107, 110, Allen). Allen feels the petitioner is ready to be reinstated. Among other things, Allen knows that the petitioner has taken courses to keep up with the law and the rules. (Tr 99-100, Allen).

Allen is also aware of the other things that were going on in the petitioner’s life at the time of her misconduct, including her brother’s drug problem and their parents’ divorce. (Tr. 104-105, Allen). Allen could see that the petitioner was very distraught; while the petitioner put up a front, she was falling apart inside and often called Allen, crying. (Tr. 106-106, Allen). However, Allen testified that the petitioner is more mature and has worked through many issues in therapy in the last two years. (Tr. 109, Allen). She has worked through her family issues and now has boundaries in her personal and professional life. (Tr. 111-112, Allen). The petitioner now has her own business and has more self-esteem. (Tr. 110-111, Allen). Allen would be willing to help the petitioner if she ran into a problem, and could also refer the petitioner to other lawyers if she needed help that was not in Allen’s field. (Tr. 100-101, 112, Allen). If the petitioner is reinstated, Allen would be willing to refer clients to her. (Tr. 114, Allen).

Morjieta Derisier is an attorney who has known the petitioner since they were in college, where they were in clubs and campus organizations together. (Tr. 143-144, 155-156, Derisier). Thereafter, they went to law school together and have remained friends. (Tr. 142-144, Derisier). She was fully knowledgeable about the nature and extent of the petitioner’s misconduct, and knew about it at the time. (Tr. 144-148, Derisier). Derisier learned later on that the petitioner had been in therapy and from talking with the petitioner, learned that she had taken responsibility for what she had done wrong, and they discussed how the petitioner should have handled things. (Tr. 149-151, Derisier). If the petitioner were to be reinstated, Derisier would be willing to be a resource for the petitioner and would recommend the petitioner to a family member of her own “without hesitation.” (Tr. 165-166, Derisier).

Shawn Thornburn is a businessman who has known the petitioner all of her life; he remembers when she was born and has watched her grow up. (Tr. 172, 178, Thornburn). He began working in the food service business with the petitioner’s father when he was a teenager. (Tr. 167-168, 171-172, Thornburn). Besides owning three of his own businesses, Thornburn is also a business partner in another entity jointly owned with the petitioner. (Tr. 167-168, 169-170, 174, Thornburn). He is familiar with all of the petitioner’s misconduct (Tr. 168-169, Thornburn), and has worked 12-hour days, side-by-side, daily, with the petitioner in the food service industry for about 15 years. (Tr. 174-175, Thornburn). He spoke very highly of the petitioner’s work ethic and her ability to deal with the stresses and strains from the industry and customer demands. (Tr. 175-178, Thornburn). He trusts the petitioner “one hundred percent,” and has given her access to all of his confidential information and bank accounts. (Tr. 171, 178-179, Thornburn). Thornburn feels the petitioner has grown considerably since her misconduct and has taken ownership of her actions; he has no hesitation about referring someone to the petitioner if she is reinstated to the bar. (Tr. 170, 180-181, Thornburn).

The petitioner also called her therapist, Gale Brunault, to testify on her behalf. The petitioner was referred to Brunault by her reinstatement counsel and Brunault agreed to accept her as a patient. (Tr. 117-118, Brunault). She has been seeing the petitioner since March 2021, and her notes were introduced as an exhibit. (Tr. 118, 132-134, Brunault; Ex. 8). When the petitioner began treating with Brunault, she had not accepted responsibility for what she had done and viewed herself as a victim of circumstance. (Tr. 119-120, Brunault). The petitioner came from a family where one did not discuss one’s problems and also felt a lot of shame about her misconduct. (Tr. 120-121, 130, Brunault). However, within eight or ten months of therapy, the petitioner began to take responsibility for her own actions. (Tr. 121-122, Brunault). It took this long because the petitioner had been raised to put aside her own problems to deal with everything else that was happening to her other family members. Culturally, that was what she was “supposed to do.”⁹ (Tr. 122, Brunault). However, despite the petitioner’s ongoing shame about her own misconduct, she now takes full ownership of it. (Tr. 122-123, Brunault).

We were persuaded by Brunault’s testimony. She had a detailed grasp of the petitioner’s misconduct, including the fact the petitioner did not know how to handle a situation where she felt the client had no meritorious case. (Tr. 123-124, Brunault). We also credit her testimony that the petitioner would not make a similar mistake if the same kind of situation arose again. The petitioner fully accepts responsibility for her own misconduct, and now has the proper boundaries with her family and others. (Tr. 127-128, Brunault). Moreover, the petitioner now has “a great support system,” including other lawyers and a therapist with whom she will stay in touch. (Tr. 124-125, 127, Brunault). However, Brunault added that the petitioner would be “okay” if “she didn’t check in,” because the petitioner now has more self-esteem and can deal with stressors, such as adversarial attorneys, deadlines and angry clients; she is now strong enough not to make poor choices. (Tr. 137-138, Brunault). She no longer thinks of herself as a powerless victim. (Tr. 139-140, Brunault). As further evidence that the petitioner has established the proper boundaries with her family, Brunault pointed out that the petitioner did not bring any family members to the reinstatement hearing (even though her father wanted to be there). (Tr. 125, 127, 135, Brunault).

We were impressed with the petitioner’s witnesses, who could speak to her character before and after her misconduct and credit the insights and observations both they and Brunault shared.

4. Conclusions About Moral Fitness

We conclude that the petitioner has the moral qualifications to be reinstated. We credit her testimony, and the testimony of others, that she has been rehabilitated. Specifically, we credit that her misconduct arose from inexperience and was exacerbated by the many issues described herein. (Tr. 17, 187, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-008/009). We also credit that the petitioner now understands this and has spent substantial time reflecting on these shortcomings. (Tr. 187, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-008/009). We credit that she now has more self-confidence, boundaries that she lacked before, and a support system to rely upon, if she returns to the practice of law. (Tr. 30-32, 182-186, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-009). She has demonstrated moral reform through her post-suspension activities. We also note that, in her testimony before us, the petitioner never sought to mitigate her misconduct due to the family issues that were ongoing during the time of the misconduct leading up to her suspension, although, as noted above, others (including her witnesses) did so. We find this as further evidence of the petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility for her misconduct and as evidence of her reform.

B. Competence and Learning in Law

Under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18, a petitioner must demonstrate that she has the “competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth.” Here, the petitioner has taken numerous continuing legal education courses, mostly through MCLE (Ex. 1 at BBO-005; Ex. 6; Tr. 45-46, 51-53, petitioner), including completing a portion of a 66-hour “master class” in Estate Planning and Administration (Tr. 20, 51-53, petitioner; Tr. 192, bar counsel) and currently keeps abreast of the daily Massachusetts advance sheets, as well Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly and the ABA Journal Weekly Newsletter. (Ex. 1 at BBO-005 and 009/010 (43 credits); Tr. 45-46, petitioner).¹⁰

The petitioner took a trust accounting webinar (Tr. 47, 50, 68, petitioner) and was also able to explain trust accounting and three-way reconciliations. (Tr. 50, petitioner).

We find and conclude that the petitioner has demonstrated sufficient competence and learning in law to meet this prong of the criteria for reinstatement.

C. Effect of Reinstatement on the Bar, the Administration of Justice and the Public Interest

"Consideration of the public welfare, not [a petitioner' s] private interest, dominates in considering the reinstatement of a disbarred applicant." Matter of Ellis, supra, 457 Mass. at 414, 26 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. at 164. The public's perception of the legal profession as a result of the reinstatement, and the effect on the bar, must be considered. "In this inquiry we are concerned not only with the actuality of the petitioner's morality and competence, but also [with] the reaction to his reinstatement by the bar and public." Matter of Gordon, supra, 385 Mass. at 52, 3 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. at 73. "The impact of a reinstatement on public confidence in the bar and in the administration of justice is a substantial concern." Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. 298, 307, 9 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 336, 345 (1993). Her successful role in managing these businesses seems to us to be a strong indication that she will be able to manage the stresses of a return to practicing law; stresses that overwhelmed her in her first year of practice.

In light of our findings of the petitioner’s moral qualifications and learning in the law, together with the testimony supporting her reinstatement, we conclude that the petitioner has met this criterion. The petitioner should also have a mentor, if reinstated.¹¹

V. Conclusions and Recommendation

Based upon the petitioner’s written submissions and her own testimony, we recommend that the petitioner be reinstated, with two conditions. First, we recommend that the petitioner complete the MCLE Master Class in Estate Planning and Administration and obtain a certificate of completion. Second, we recommend that the petitioner have a mentor who is acceptable to bar counsel (whether Attorney Malgeri or someone else), for a period of time acceptable to bar counsel.

Dated: October 28, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

By the Hearing Panel,

__________________________________

Ashley E. Hayes, Esq., Chair

__________________________________

Rita Balian Allen, Member

__________________________________

Richard C. Van Nostrand, Esq., Member

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1 The transcript is referred to as “Tr. [page].” and the hearing exhibits are referred to as “Ex.__.” We have considered all of the evidence, but we have not attempted to identify all evidence supporting our findings where the evidence is cumulative. We credit the testimony cited in support of our findings to the extent of the findings, and we do not credit contradictory testimony.

2 While the suspension was for less than a year and a day, the petitioner was not entitled to apply for “automatic reinstatement” under S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(1)(b) because the Order of Term Suspension specifically required her to petition for reinstatement pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(4). (Ex. 4 at BBO-037).

3 This narrative is largely drawn from Ex. 2, the suspension order and memorandum of decision, with additional citations to testimony and other exhibits.

4 This was only her third case as a lawyer. (Tr. 11, 22, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-008).

5 In her reinstatement Questionnaire, the petitioner said that “the client had asked me to do things that were unethical, [and] I did not know how to handle the client or the problem.” Ex. 1 at BBO-008. At the hearing, she was not asked nor did she volunteer what those unethical requests involved.

6 At the hearing, she did not provide any details of her conversation with the client in prison.

7 We credit the petitioner’s testimony that her brother’s addiction was considered to be shameful and that he threatened to kill himself if their father learned of it, so the petitioner tried to help him alone. She put her brother in rehab four times but he could not get clean, so she finally informed her parents, after which their father got adequate help for her brother and he has now been clean for six years. (Tr. 14, 25, petitioner). In addition, her business had been robbed during this time period. (Tr. 122, Brunault).

8 We take administrative notice of the fact that FAFSA stands for “Free Application for Federal Student Aid,” which is a form completed by current and prospective college students to determine their eligibility for student financial aid.

9 The petitioner’s father emigrated from Lebanon and maintained the Lebanese culture in the family. That culture was “very strict” and the demands upon and expectations of the petitioner were higher than those that her friends had. (Tr. 8, petitioner). Ms. Brunault also described it - “I think in her world you don’t talk about problems because one problem in the family becomes everybody’s problem.” Further, “(petitioner) dug herself a hole that it took a long time for her to really own it and find a way to separate herself from her family …” (Tr. 120, Brunault).

10 We credit the petitioner’s testimony that, while the course certificates (Ex. 6) all show courses taken within a short period of time, this was actually the second time she took these courses. The first time she took the online MCLE courses, she did not know about the attendance prompts and obtaining the certificates. (Tr. 44-46, petitioner).

11 The petitioner and Attorney Donna Malgeri have agreed to enter into a mentoring agreement, which was provided to the Hearing Panel although not made an Exhibit. (Tr. 33, 36, 60, 80, petitioner; Ex. 1 at BBO-006). While Attorney Malgeri did not testify, the petitioner testified that Attorney Malgeri is a “seasoned attorney” who runs a small firm and has been practicing for 27 years. (Tr. 34, petitioner). Attorney Malgeri was also acceptable to Bar Counsel who indicated that it was “a good catch for this petitioner to have someone in place who is seasoned and who has the time and focus to give her. (Tr. 192).

Related to No. BD-2016-059

• Order of Term Suspension entered by Justice Botsford on January 20, 2017., 01/19/2017
• Judgment of Reinstatement, 12/18/2024