In the Matter of Doreen M. Zankowski

 

IN RE: MATTER OF DOREEN M. ZANKOWSKI

BBO NO. 558381

The following opinion was posted at the time it was issued. It may be subject to appeal and may not be the final decision in the case. Readers are advised to check the BBO and SJC websites for more information.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS

OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

______________________________

In the Matter of Doreen M.

Zankowski,

Petition for Reinstatement

______________________________

S.J.C. No. BD-2019-006

MEMORANDUM OF BOARD DECISION

In 2021, the Supreme Judicial Court suspended the petitioner’s law license for two years for fraudulently billing corporate clients. In 2024, the petitioner filed for reinstatement of her license. A hearing was held on October 18, 2024 after which a majority of the panel recommended reinstatement while a dissenting panelist opined that the petitioner lacks the moral qualifications for restoration of her license as required by our jurisprudence. Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that the petitioner has carried her burden to prove that she qualifies for reinstatement We recommend that the court reinstate her to the roll of Massachusetts lawyers.¹ Our reasons follow.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1991, eventually becoming a partner at a large firm with a focus on construction law and commercial litigation. In 2017, bar counsel charged her with intentionally inflating by approximately 450 hours the amount of attorney time she billed to her four largest clients resulting in over $200,000 in unearned fees in 2015. The petitioner explained that 2015 was an unusually busy and stressful year for her; her practice doubled from $2 million in billings to over $4 million.² After a hearing, the committee concluded that she had violated Rules 1.5(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. In addition to the gravamen of the disciplinary charges, the hearing committee found that the petitioner testified evasively and dishonestly. The hearing committee recommended a license suspension of one year and one day. On appeal, the board adopted the committee’s findings and conclusions and recommended a suspension of two years. On November 18, 2019, the Single Justice rejected the board’s recommendation and instead imposed a six-month suspension. Bar counsel appealed to the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court. While the appeal was pending, the petitioner was reinstated from the six-month suspension.³ After a hearing, on March 25, 2021, the court imposed a two-year suspension, as the board had originally recommended with credit for the previously-served six months. In aggravation, the court found that the petitioner was experienced in the practice of law, had lacked candor in her trial testimony, and had failed to acknowledge the nature, effects or implications of her misconduct.

On February 28, 2024, the petitioner filed for reinstatement from the two-year suspension. A hearing was held on October 18, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, bar counsel stated that he would neither oppose nor support the petition. Two of the hearing panelists recommended reinstatement, while a third member of the panel recommended denial on the basis that the petitioner lacked the moral qualifications for reinstatement and restoring her license would be detrimental to the integrity of the bar and the administration of justice. Although neither party has appealed, we have reviewed the matter de novo, including the petitioner’s responses to the reinstatement questionnaire, the hearing transcript, and the exhibits.

As discussed more fully in the next section of our memorandum, we review a reinstatement petition for three elements: whether the petitioner has the moral qualifications to resume practice; whether she has maintained her learning and competence in the law; and the effect of reinstatement on the bar, the administration of justice and the public interest. We will review the underlying facts and procedural history within this framework.

Moral Qualifications

The conduct that caused the petitioner’s suspension proves she lacks the moral qualifications to practice law. Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 460, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 134 (1975).⁴ To resume practice, the petitioner has the burden of proving that she has redeemed herself and has led a “sufficiently exemplary life to inspire public confidence once again in spite of [her] previous actions.” Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92 (1996). "It [is] incumbent on [the petitioner], therefore, to establish affirmatively that, during [her] suspension period, [she has] redeemed [herself] and become 'a person proper to be held out by the court to the public as trustworthy’.” Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1010-1011, 16 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 94, 95 (2000); see also Matter of Ellis, 457 Mass. 413, 414, 26 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 158, 163-164 (2010).

After her suspension, the petitioner utilized her construction and engineering skills (she was trained and employed as an urban planner before going to law school) to work as a construction consultant on an as-needed basis for Anthemion Senior Lifestyles, LLC, helping plan a residential memory care facility known as Cordwainer. She was paid for some of her work and did other tasks at no charge. She also volunteered at the facility to work directly with its residents. According to her supervisor, the petitioner’s work was excellent, and the residents enjoyed being with her. In addition to Cordwainer, the petitioner also worked for a former client, William Thibeault, who owned a development company. She was paid for some of the work and did other work for free. She informed both employers of her suspension.

In addition to employment, the petitioner has volunteered at Regis College, her alma mater, some of which work preceded her suspension. She served on the Board of Trustees, chairing the board’s Philanthropy Committee as well as other committees. During her suspension, she established an endowed scholarship in her parents’ names and has donated significant funds to the college. She has mentored students. Outside Regis, the petitioner has volunteered, speaking with a second-year law student at Boston University to discuss her experience and career, helping to care for her sister during a difficult time in 2022, working with the homeless at Saint Cecilia Parish and training to become a CCD teacher. With her partner, she has cared for a young cousin whose parents struggle with substance use disorder. During the summer of 2023, she spent five to six days per week with him, teaching him golf and chess and generally listening to and nurturing him. Overall, the panel looked favorably on the petitioner’s employment and volunteerism.

The hearing panel struggled with whether the petitioner recognized the nature and extent of her misconduct. At the conclusion of her testimony, she seemed forthrightly to accept her errors:

I made a terrible mistake. Worse than a mistake. I was found by the SJC to be dishonest. I accept that. I will never ever do anything like that again. I own it. I understand it. And I will never go back to practicing in a manner that I’m working, you know, seven days a week, many hours a day. I don’t want that lifestyle. I’m not going to do it. It caused me to make mistakes. More than mistakes. It caused me to screw up royally and be dishonest and messy. And, as the SJC said, misrepresented clients. Breached my fiduciary duty. Not going back there again.

(Hearing Panel Report (HPR), page 10).

In addition to the above acknowledgment, the petitioner took responsibility for her fraudulent bills, admitting that they contained “misrepresentations,” “inaccuracies” and “falsehoods.” (Reinstatement Hearing Transcript, p. 40). She admitted breaching her fiduciary duties to her clients and former partners (Id., p. 45). She admitted acting dishonestly. (Id).

Consistent with the above, in her written responses to the reinstatement questionnaire, the petitioner described her misconduct as, “intentionally billing clients for services that were not rendered,” attributing this in part to her “egregious time entry and billing procedures.” She described adding hundreds of hours to the time entries of associates who worked for her and unequivocally admitted that on twelve dates the sum of the hours she claimed for herself exceeded 24 hours in a single day and that on several occasions she billed clients for depositions she had not attended. She stated clearly that she “own[s]” the false billing and, “I accept the SJC’s decision.” (HPR, page 9, citing Hearing Transcript, pp. 42-43).

At other times, the petitioner was less frank. She wrote in the questionnaire response that she “believed in 2015 and continues to believe to this day that I actually worked all of the hours that I claimed on my bills.” The equivocation continued at the reinstatement hearing. While admitting that the bills included “misrepresentations, [i]naccuracies, [f]alsehoods,” that were “my fault,” she also blamed the fact that she did not keep her time contemporaneously and that this practice was “very very neglectful” and “negligent.” She acknowledged that billing more than 24 hours in a single day was “just wrong,” but also tried to explain the misconduct by blaming her system for tracking billable and nonbillable time and blamed her false attendance at depositions as a problem of “nomenclature.” On cross examination, she told bar counsel that she believed and continues to believe that she actually worked all of the hours claim in her bills and that she “did not intentionally overbill anyone.” (HPR, pages 9-10).

Since 2020, the petitioner consistently has attended professional conduct group meetings at Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (LCL). Barbara Bowe, who leads the group at LCL, wrote to the hearing panel that the petitioner was “frank and open with new members about how this resulted in her suspension. Over time, she has come to accept that her billing practices were viewed as questionable.” In addition to LCL, the petitioner meets weekly with a therapist, who also submitted a supporting letter to the panel. The therapist submitted a “detailed and specific letter in support of the petitioner’s reinstatement.” In it, she wrote that the petitioner approached their conversations with “honesty, openness and humility; she now accepts the findings of the court and understands that she alone was the responsible party.” (HPR, page 15). The therapist also wrote that the petitioner had come to understand the “underlying dynamics which may have influenced her choices” and “has a plan in place for the future. … She appreciates that she needs to know when to ask for help and understands the need to establish boundaries and not allow herself to become over-extended.” (Id).

In support of reinstatement, the petitioner called two witnesses to the hearing and offered supporting letters from several others. The live witnesses were the president of Regis College and one of the petitioner’s employers. Both testified positively about their experience and interactions with her. Both testified that the petitioner acknowledged her misconduct. In addition to the live testimony, the petitioner submitted letters from colleagues and lawyers who attested to her good character.

A significant issue arose from the petitioner’s involvement in litigation concerning a vacation property she purchased in Hawaii. The petitioner and her domestic partner purchased, with another couple (Dr. Howard and Sheree Hill), the property in 2015. For many years, the couples had been friends and had discussed sharing a vacation home. In contemporaneous notes, the petitioner purportedly indicated that the Hills would contribute 60% toward purchase and the petitioner and her partner would jointly pay the other 40%, with an option to purchase 10% over ten years (with the result that the ownership would be shared equally) but that the parties intended that the ownership would be equal regardless of the initial contribution. The parties were jointly and severally responsible for a note and mortgage secured by the property. They paid partially in cash, splitting the cash payment 60/40. However, the deed to the property reflected that the couples owned the property equally (50/50). The relationship soured and the property was sold in 2022 before the petitioner and her partner paid the difference in order to equalize the ownership.

A dispute arose regarding the distribution of the net sales proceeds, which led to litigation filed by the Hills against the petitioner and her partner in Essex Superior Court. Relying on the deed she drafted, the petitioner insisted that she and her partner were entitled to half the proceeds even though they had contributed only 40% of the purchase price. After a jury-waived trial, the Superior Court judge concluded that the Hills were entitled to 60% of the purchase price, not 50% as asserted by the petitioner and her partner. In support of her conclusion, the judge found that the parties had not agreed to own the property equally if the petitioner and her partner made only a 40% contribution to the down payment and carrying costs, in effect rejecting the petitioner’s testimony. She also found that the petitioner had acted as attorney for the Hills throughout the process and did not credit her testimony that she told Dr. Hill several times that he needed to hire his own counsel. Instead, the judge specifically credited Dr. Hill’s testimony that the petitioner had told him he did not need his own lawyer for the closing because the parties shared the same interests. With this finding, the judge concluded that the petitioner, who had drafted the documents, had breached her fiduciary duty to the Hills when she drafted the deed reflecting a 50/50 split when the petitioner and her partner had contributed only 40% at the time of the closing. However, the judge awarded the Hills no damages from the breach of duty claim, finding that they had not suffered any actual damages and had in fact benefitted from the petitioner’s work. Without being called as a witness by either bar counsel or the respondent, Dr. Hill appeared at the reinstatement hearing and asked to testify, which the panel allowed. He argued against reinstatement, complaining that “after 25 years, he has ‘come to realize that [the petitioner] makes up things that she feels are truths and then she believes them. So she was not telling the truth, but she believes she was.’” (HPR, page 14). Concluding that Dr. Hill had “an axe to grind” the panel did not credit his testimony. (Id). Based on all of the foregoing, which was thoroughly and thoughtfully reviewed by the hearing panel, a majority of its members concluded that the petitioner had demonstrated the moral fitness for reinstatement. The majority acknowledged that “this was not an easy conclusion to reach, as we were not overwhelmed by the petitioner’s presentation.” (HPR, page 20). However, despite the “fits and starts” of her testimony, the majority concluded that she eventually “work[ed] her way up to a consistent and emphatic admission of intentionally dishonest conduct.” (Id., at pages 20-21). The majority found her “credible in remorse.” (Id). A dissenting member disagreed, concluding that the petitioner had failed to acknowledge her prior misconduct and that her testimony during the Hill litigation demonstrated a continuing pattern of dishonesty.

Competence and Learning in the Law

The panel majority concluded that the petitioner had demonstrated sufficient competence and learning in the law. The dissenting member did not write in disagreement. While suspended, the petition took over 50 continuing legal education classes on a variety of topics. Three of the classes were “extensive.” (HPR, page 24).

Effect of Reinstatement on the Bar, the Administration of Justice, and the Public Interest

Consistent with their conclusions about moral fitness, the panel split on the final element for reinstatement. The majority concluded that the petitioner’s resumption of practice would not be adverse to the administration of justice, the bar, or the public interest. The dissenting member concluded otherwise. In addition to his findings on moral fitness, the dissenting member noted that the disciplinary case had received widespread attention, requiring “scrupulous” and “meticulous” attention to the petitioner’s qualifications to resume practice.

Discussion

A petitioner for reinstatement bears the burden of proving that she has satisfied the requirements set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, Section 18(5), specifically, that she has “the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth, and that his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to the public interest.” Matter of Leo, 484 Mass. 1050, 1051, 36 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 296, 298 (2020); B.B.O. Rules, § 3.65.

There is no question that the petitioner has satisfied the requirement that she maintain her competence and learning in the law. Accordingly, we focus on the issue that divided the hearing panel: whether the petitioner has the moral qualifications to resume practice. The conclusion about the effect of reinstatement on the administration of justice, the bar, and the public interest the third element in the reinstatement inquiry) follows logically from our conclusion about moral fitness.

Like the hearing panel majority, we find that the petitioner has acknowledged her misconduct, although we agree the case is close. Her witnesses (both those who testified and those who submitted letters) were adamant that she has learned a great deal from the experience and has fulsomely engaged with her past behavior as well as the need to make changes in her work life to avoid a recurrence. The petitioner’s testimony and her answers to the questionnaire articulated the same thoughts. We acknowledge, as did the panel, that the testimony wavered. At times, the petitioner retreated into equivocation, describing her misconduct as negligent and the result of sloppy record-keeping. She tried both to accept the SJC’s decision to suspend her while claiming that she believed and continues to believe that she worked all of the hours she billed. The inconsistency is troubling in light of the findings in the disciplinary case. However, as the panel majority noted, “[w]e do not demand perfection in these proceedings, only proof of moral redemption.” (HPR, page 22). While the explanations were flawed, they were not excuses. In Matter of Finnerty, 34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 103, 108 (2018), a Single Justice reversed our recommendation and granted a petition for reinstatement even where the petitioner made two misleading characterizations about his misconduct. As the court has instructed, we must view reinstatement petitions holistically and avoid focusing on isolated comments. Relying on Finnerty, in Matter of Fingliss, SJC No. BD-2019-007 and SJC No. BD-2006-0237 (2023), we recommended reinstatement even though the petitioner’s written answers to the reinstatement questionnaire “were imperfect and raise[d] concerns.” Id., at p. 10. We “balance[d] those questions against the petitioner’s attributes, including his extensive charitable work and support from the community (attesting to his moral character) and his commitment to learning and competence in the law.” Id. See also Matter of Hession, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 284 (2015) (panel recommended reinstatement even though written answers were neither accurate nor complete); Matter of Thalheimer, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 620, 626-627 (2015) (reinstatement recommended even though petitioner’s testimony “contained elements of wanting to have it both ways,” admitting “intentionally negligent” conduct and blaming “bad bookkeeping” despite a finding of intentional misuse).

In addition, we note that two of the three hearing panelists found the petitioner credible in her expressions of remorse. We must defer to their findings unless contradicted by other evidence, which is absent here. B.B.O. Rules, § 3.53. In sum, we do not view the imperfections as fatal to the petition.⁵ We adopt the panel majority’s finding that the petitioner has acknowledged, and expressed remorse for, her misconduct.

We turn next to the petitioner’s testimony in the litigation with the Hills. While the dispute with the Hills arose prior to the petitioner’s suspension, the litigation continued thereafter and ended in a bench trial while the reinstatement petition was pending. As recited above, the dispute led to a jury-waived trial in Superior Court. The trial judge specifically found that the petitioner’s testimony was not credible on two key points. The judge did not accept the petitioner’s testimony that she had explained to Dr. Hill that she was not serving as his attorney in the transaction. Based on the finding, the judge concluded, not only that the petitioner did not testify truthfully, but that she had misled Dr. and Mrs. Hill about her role. They relied on their reasonable belief that the petitioner was looking out for their interests when, in fact, she drafted documents that she later tried to use to advance her own agenda at their expense. Second, the judge concluded that the parties had not agreed to a 50/50 split of the sales proceeds since the petitioner and her partner had paid only 40% of the purchase price. On this point, she found the petitioner’s testimony not credible.

The judge’s observations and conclusions do not bind us. They are simply evidence that the hearing panel and the full board may consider in evaluating the petitioner’s fitness to resume practice. While troubled by the events in the Hill matter, we view them in context. From all accounts, the litigation was contentious, made more so by the end of a friendship. Dr. Hill obviously wanted to exact a measure of revenge, since he appeared voluntarily and without prompting at the reinstatement hearing. We take his conclusory assertions with a grain of salt. More vexing are the findings and comments by the Superior Court judge, who found the testimony of the petitioner to be not credible. However, the testimony took place in the context of an adversarial proceeding. Her trial testimony was consistent with the position she took throughout the dispute and the litigation. The trial court judge did not elaborate on the factual basis underlying her conclusion; she wrote only that she found the petitioner’s testimony about the 60/40 split and her discussion with Dr. Hill to be not credible. (Hearing Exhibit 2, Bates Page 225-226, ¶ 9 and 11). We do not know the details of the testimony, only the judge’s conclusion.

While we do not question the judge’s conclusion that the petitioner’s testimony was not credible, we hesitate to resolve her reinstatement on that single issue. We were not at the trial and were not privy to the myriad factors that could affect a judge’s decision to reject a litigant’s testimony. We should not concentrate a reinstatement recommendation on events at such a distance. In addition, as we discuss below, we are mindful of other factors that support the petitioner’s case.

When recommending a suspended lawyer for reinstatement, we must assess whether the bar and the public may be confident that the petitioner has learned their lesson and will not engage in future unethical conduct. This assessment relies partly on expressions of remorse and an articulated understanding of what went wrong. But it also may rely on other facts, many of which are present here. We are impressed by the numerous good works performed by the petitioner, including philanthropy. We also note the number of hours she has committed to continuing legal education. To us, this commitment demonstrates the gravity with which the petitioner will resume practice. Along similar lines, the petitioner has implemented changes in her lifestyle designed to avoid similar problems in the future. We are impressed by the strong, unequivocal support from colleagues, including a former law partner. The petitioner was candid with all of these witnesses about her license suspension. She did not try to elide her misconduct.⁶

At the end of the day, a petitioner for reinstatement asks us to consider whether they will engage in future misconduct. Based on a review of all the evidence (and conceding that predicting the future is an inexact science), we are satisfied that the risk is minimal. We are confident that the petitioner recognizes her past mistakes and is unlikely to repeat them. We are similarly confident that the public and the bar will appreciate the careful scrutiny we bring to every reinstatement petition. Given our interest in rehabilitation, reform and second chances, we do not view the petitioner’s reinstatement as contrary to the public welfare.

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Board of Bar Overseers recommends to the Supreme Judicial Court that the petition for reinstatement be allowed.

__________________________

Frank E. Hill, III

Secretary

Dated: April 14, 2025

__________________________

1 Our decision is not unanimous. Five board members voted to recommend reinstatement; four board members voted to recommend denial.

2 The petitioner’s former law firm refunded the overpayments to the clients.

3 This reinstatement was automatic. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(1) (automatic reinstatement for suspension of six months or less upon lawyer filing affidavit of compliance). After the decision from the full court, the two-year suspension took effect, with credit for the six-month suspension.

4 The presumed lack of moral qualifications is discussed in the present tense, not just the past. The judgment of disbarment “continues to be evidence against . . . (the petitioner) with respect to lack of moral character at later times in accordance with the principle that ‘a state of things once proved to exist may generally be found to continue.’” Hiss, supra (citations omitted). “Whatever the offense for which a judgment of disbarment was entered, the person disbarred has a heavy burden on a subsequent petition for admission to the bar to overcome by evidence the weight of the facts adjudicated by such judgment and to establish affirmatively that since [her] disbarment [she] has become a person proper to be held out by the court to the public as trustworthy.” Id., at 460-461.

5 Even a lawyer convicted of a serious crime does not need to admit his guilt in order to be reinstated. Matter of Hiss, supra, 368 Mass. at 454, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 129. The court (and we) focus on the petitioner’s “present[] trustworthy[iness] … and upright character, not that they are willing to admit past mistakes.” Hiss, supra, 368 Mass. at 455, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 130. While expressions of remorse and concessions of wrongdoing may be relevant, they are not outcome-determinative. “[T]o satisfy the requirements of present good moral character in the tests for reinstatement noted above, it is sufficient that the petitioner adduce substantial proof that he has ‘such an appreciations of the distinctions between right and wrong in the conduct of men [sic] toward each other as will make him a fit and safe person to engage in the practice of law.’” Id., citing In re Koenig, 152 Conn. 125, 132 (1964). In 1974, the Supreme Judicial Court reinstated Alger Hiss to the bar, even though Hiss continued to deny that in 1950 he had committed perjury before a federal grand jury when he denied that he or his wife in his presence had turned over State Department documents to Whittaker Chambers, a Communist spy, or that he had seen Chambers after 1937. See United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950). Hiss had been found guilty, he exhausted his appeals, and he served a prison sentence of three and one-half years. At his reinstatement hearing in 1974, he continued to maintain his innocence. The court reinstated his license.

6 A former colleague reviewed the decisions leading to the petitioner’s suspension and discussed them with her. At the reinstatement hearing, the colleague testified that she had been “bothered … the most” by the false billing for depositions. She discussed her concerns with the petitioner, who admitted that she had “did it” and took responsibility. In the witness’s view, the petitioner was remorseful and regretful. (Hearing Transcript, pp. 119-120).

Related to No. BD-2019-006

• S.J.C. Order of Term Suspension entered by Justice Gaziano on November 18, 2019., 11/18/2019
• Amended Order of Term Suspension in Accordance with the Judgment After Rescript, 05/25/2021
• Hearing Panel Report, 12/06/2024
• Judgment of Reinstatement, 04/29/2025